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A new entrant in a network industry faces a very difficult situation if it wishes to compete 
with a company already on the market. According to Bara (2006), competition is endangered 
by two factors: the state and the competitors themselves. However, such sectors exist where 
competition can not develop in a natural manner. Concerning the network industries and the 
competition policy guarding the newly formed/forming competitive energy markets, the 
challenge is especially the characteristic that the operation of the market, the opening itself, 
is not necessarily able to eliminate the monopoly structure. Thus the subject of our analysis 
is the effect of energy market liberalization, launched a decade ago in the European Union, 
on the competition in the sector. Has the European Union in reality reached the effect it 
planned or has the opposite occurred? 
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1. Introduction 
In the opinion of Bara (2006), competition is endangered within a sector by two 
factors: the state and the competitors themselves. However, such sectors exist where 
competition can not develop in a natural manner. Concerning the network industries 
and the competition policy guarding the newly formed/forming competitive energy 
markets, the challenge is especially the characteristic that the operation of the 
market, the opening itself, is not necessarily able to eliminate the monopoly 
structure (Kovács 2008). This can be explained by the fact that the entry to the 
market is not only incidental but can also be immensely costly and risky owing to 
the entry barriers demonstrated previously. A new entrant in a network industry 
faces a very difficult situation if it wishes to compete with a company already on the 
market (in position) (hereinafter: incumbent), since it is not enough to simply offer a 
better and/or cheaper product if the expectation of the consumer is that nobody 
would buy the product. The less compatible the new service is with the existing one, 
as well as the more committed the consumers are toward the incumbents, the greater 
this self-fulfilling expectation is (Kovács 2008). Thus, such markets (owing to some 
artificial, structural or strategic causes) are closed to the potential competitors, and 
their actors are called natural monopolies by the literature. Telecommunications, 
railway transport, gas and electricity service, basic public services (water, sewage, 
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waste transportation, public lighting, etc.), and postal services all belonged to this 
group, among others, until now. “In these sectors problems of competition arise 
from the closed nature of the market, thus from the fact that in case of the state‟s 
inaction (lack of state legislation) only the incumbent company, protected by the 
monopoly position, is able to reach the consumer” (Bara 2006, p. 208.). 
Competition starts when these markets open, owing to the creation of the conditions 
for the wide availability of the indispensable instruments as was done during the 
liberalization initiated in 1998. In present article we forbear demonstration of the 
technical and regulatory side of market opening, thus here the requirements and 
consequences of competition law, with respect to liberalization, will be provided.  
1.1. Changes in competition policy owing to liberalization 
Thanks to the EU legislation, as a consequence of the sharpening competition, the 
consumers – also thanks to their more and more conscious behaviour and quality 
expectations – are theoretically able to use the public services in increasingly better 
quality. Nevertheless, an insolvable contradiction seems to exist between the 
securing of basic services, the increase of the level of services, as well as the 
narrowing resources, increase of efficiency and the interest in profit. Development 
of the services, including liberalization, necessarily involved the development of 
competition policy since competition policy and competition regulation, as its 
practical manifestation almost everywhere, is one of, if not the most, efficient 
instruments (Motta 2007). Consumers had and have to be assured that the opening of 
newer and newer public service sectors for competition does not affect them 
disadvantageously. Competition policy tried to follow the changes occurring in the 
services market – the rearrangement of power in favour of the tertiary sector, as well 
as transnationalization. Thus in the life of the European communities the direction of 
competition policy occurring from the 1970s mostly in industry mirrors well the 
changes happening almost forty years later in the services market (Pelle 2009). 
Three important processes can be seen lately in the competition policy of the 
EU. One is that the sectoral legislation and the general competition legislation are 
becoming closer to each other (1). Earlier, the general notion was that the task of 
competition regulation is to keep well in hand the occurring market behaviours 
independently from the sector, without sector-specific analysis and legislation – the 
sectoral regulations fulfilled this task – while nowadays more and more regulators 
realize that the specific market and the currently existing, restricted or in some cases 
non-existing competition cannot be treated as totally independently from each other. 
Therefore market analyses have become the basic instrument of modern competition 
policy1, according to Motta (2007). 
                                                   
1 The analyses on liberalization beyond a certain depth required the comprehensive study of the 
concerned sectors, which has appeared as a new institution in the European economic integration. The 
Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission had been entrusted with the task of 
preparation of sectoral studies. With respect to the new scope of authority, those service sectors had 
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It is beneficial to make a short detour in order to define the difference between 
general competition regulation and sectoral competition regulation. In certain 
sectors of the sphere of public services, regulation is twofold, as in the sector of gas 
services. One part of it covers all the public services and their common points; the 
other part is expressly sector-specific, and relates to its economics. In the case of the 
regulation of monopoly markets, competition regulation and sectoral regulation 
differ from each other. Task of the latter in this case is to guarantee that even in the 
lack of competition, optimal conditions should be attained for the society. Frontiers 
between competition and sectoral regulation fade away when in monopoly markets – 
in our case in the previously monopolized gas markets providing public services, as 
the effect of liberalization – competition occurs. At this time “…the regulator of the 
competition has to deal with the monopoly markets, while the regulator of the 
monopolistic sectoral markets has to deal with the competition markets.” (Kiss 
2008, p. 23.) Nevertheless, the newly liberalized markets still significantly differ 
from the operating oligopoly competitive markets. They still have the public service 
and sectoral characteristics, and to understand their operation and for effective 
regulation, being familiar with the specific market is essential. It is generally true 
that the general requirements of competition should be achieved grounded upon the 
peculiarities of the sector. In the viewpoint of the EU, competition policy in itself is 
not able to induce competition in all circumstances; for this, companies have to 
operate generally in such economic circumstances which stimulate competition. In 
an indirect way, synchronized with the adequate sectoral policy, this can contribute 
to the improvement of the competitiveness of the European Union.  
The second phenomenon is that some kind of convergence can be found in the 
regulation (2). Since the object of regulation is the same, competition, the applied 
instruments, that is market analyses, are also becoming closer and closer to each 
other, and thus clearly convergence also appears in the regulation (Pelle 2009). 
However, the synergy seems to be realized in the case of the EU, in spite of the fact 
that convergence, during which the regulatory tasks of the liberalized markets are 
transferred to the competition regulators, as well as the taking of public service and 
other sectoral elements into the functions of competition regulators, is still going on. 
Fitting to the general competition regulation, deadlines in the sectoral regulations for 
the new phases of market opening fell into the period between 2007 and 2009 
(Valentiny 2008). Based on the previous experiences, sectoral regulations promised 
more frequent and often more radical changes when compared to competition 
regulation.  
The third element is deregulation (3). This is grounded upon the idea the aims 
are often more efficiently reached by operation of the market than by regulation. 
Thus, the primary goal of regulation should be the assurance of the operation of the 
                                                                                                                                   
been named which are under scrutiny. These are the following (DG Comp. EC 2008b): electricity and 
gas services, financial services, media, postal services (relevant case: COMP/36.915), 
telecommunications, and professional services.  
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market, which on the other hand can only be provided by the synchronized 
development of the sectoral and competition regulation (Pelle 2009). Naturally, this 
is true for the group of public services, especially for the energy market, only in a 
restricted way. The necessity of the regulation and its indispensable importance has 
been acknowledged since the market opening in the gas markets. Thus, in this sector 
we should not mention deregulation, but rather “re-regulation”.  
Generally, the development of competition regulation looks similar 
irrespective of the sector. Usually a legal case calls attention to the deficiencies of 
the market. Subsequently a comprehensive, public, market analysing, sectoral 
inquiry takes place with the participation of different professional and social 
organizations. (In the case of the gas market this came about in 20052.) Taking the 
consequences as a starting point, the Commission drafts proposals, and then the final 
outcome is embodied in the development of the applicable law (Pelle 2009). Thus it 
is well demonstrated that competition cases form a very important part of the 
European competition law, since the outcome of these competition cases affect the 
regulation of competition. Starting right from the cases appearing before of the 
Commission to the rendered decisions, as well as the new, more market-conformed 
and competition-strengthening behaviours displayed by the companies, the effects of 
the above-mentioned situation can be seen.  
It is important to highlight that competition law – especially outside of Europe 
– does not stand by itself, and is only one of the integration policies. For this, the 
most spectacular and mostly cited example is the policy of the internal market 
ensuring the four freedoms, which is directed against the state measures which 
hinder integration, while competition regulation takes steps against those measures 
of the market actors which have the same direction. Hence this means that the 
barriers of trade eliminated gradually in the course of years are not allowed through 
the competition policy to be rebuilt by the companies. Thus thanks to the 
convergence in the market of public services, as well as in other sectors, the relevant 
EU and state competition regulation should be applied adequately owing to the 
compulsion originating from the market opening3. The basis of the competition 
regulation of the EU is provided in the Rome Treaty founding the European 
                                                   
2 The Commission was entrusted with the task of conducting a comprehensive inquiry (Energy Sector 
Inquiry) which took into account the competition aspects of the energy sector in 2005. More detailed 
information is available on the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html. The aim of the inquiry was to 
prepare an in-depth analysis for the exploration of the characteristics of operation, or rather, the causes 
of the inadequate operation. This is all for the improvement of the competitiveness of the whole 
European economy through bringing it to perfection. The above mentioned final report was prepared 
based on this comprehensive inquiry, and published in January, 2007.  
3 According to the economic idea behind the legislation, these are such public services which would not 
operate if the state did not provide them. The two main aspects are the operation of the service and its 
safety. The EU has started to examine whether these are really public services, and to what extent (the 
size of the part), and whether competition can be introduced to the market of these services (EC DG 
Comp. cited by Pelle 2009).  
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Economic Community and its amendments. Specifically, it is Articles 101 and 102, 
as well as 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) that regulate the 
behaviour of the companies, while Articles 107–108 contain the rules on state aid. 
Article 106 (2) of the TFEU states in this respect that undertakings entrusted with 
the operation of services of general economic interest are subject to the rules 
contained in the TFEU, in particular to the rules on competition4. As a new element, 
liberalization has occurred, it has become the frontier territory of the community 
competition policy.  
2. Concentration in the energy sector 
According to Bara (2006), groups of competition problems relating to market 
opening are composed of such sector-specific questions like: which are these 
aspects, how can they be realized in the particular sector, and what, how, and when 
should they be (or should they not be) regulated? During the preparation for, 
establishment of, and finally execution of the market opening, the European Union 
might find itself opposing primarily the member states, and then the major actors if 
they do not or inadequately take into account the objectives of the creation of the 
competition and the aspects of the competition itself. The danger of this might be 
that in spite of the market opening, no efficient competition forms in the relevant 
sector. Furthermore, in the case of opening of the European gas market, this process 
can even demonstrate some opposing aspects. Thus, in the following we map 
whether the gas market liberalization – as well as including a few cases concerning 
the whole energy market – is able to create – if only a restricted – competitive 
market, or if we are just witnessing a concentration. Subsequently concentration is 
interpreted in accordance with these categories:  
– As the consequence of the separation, horizontal and vertical cartels have 
formed in the gas market (or in the whole energy market) owing to different 
considerations (effectiveness, economies of scale, strategic considerations, 
etc.)  
                                                   
4 Art. 106 (2): “Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or 
having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the 
Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of 
trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.” 
However, Article 106 (2) allows an exception from the rules contained in the Treaty, provided that a 
number of criteria are met. Firstly, there must be an act of entrustment, whereby the State confers 
responsibility for the execution of a certain task to an undertaking. Secondly, the entrustment must 
relate to a service of general economic interest. Thirdly, the exception (compensation) has to be 
necessary for the performance of the tasks assigned and proportional to that end (the necessity 
requirement). Finally, the development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be 
contrary to the interests of the EU. 
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– Owing to different reasons, but the dominant position of national incumbents 
is increasing  
– Owing to different reasons, takeovers and mergers might take place more 
frequently in the gas market (energy market).  
 
When observing this from an institutional point of view, instead of looking at 
the behaviour, the listing can be reversed. In the above-mentioned situation the 
actors are institutionally independent from each other and are not necessarily in a 
dominant position, they are “just” collaborating and cooperating. Competition policy 
has to deal with them in an ex post way. From this aspect it is worse if the structure 
is already established, for example by mergers and takeovers, or if owing to state aid 
monopolies can be created. In such cases there are grounds only for ex post de facto 
sectoral regulation, monitoring and competition authority.  
2.1. Mergers and takeovers in the energy sector 
Energy sectors are characterized by the operation of relatively few undertakings, but 
at the same time ones of great size. Within this group of undertakings, mergers and 
takeovers frequently take place, which result in such a concentration of ownership 
that directly affects the structure of the market, and the intensity and conditions of 
the competition. It is becoming more and more obvious that the energy sector is 
traditionally the hunting grounds of the transnational companies, where lately, 
partially as a consequence of vertical separation conducted in accordance with 
liberalization, concentration has increased.  
What can motivate the fusions that aim at convergence and/or concentration? 
The first reason for this can be that the companies interested in the energy industry 
would rather spend their profit on takeovers than additional investments in their 
own business policy. Secondly, although the aim or means of liberalization was the 
vertical separation of the supply chains, for the energy generating undertakings a 
new vertical integration is more beneficial, owing to the possibility of reducing 
transactional costs, than the establishment of contractual relations substituting it. 
With respect to passage through the sectors, the energy generating companies and 
the gas transmitting undertakings mutually enjoy the above-mentioned advantages of 
the synergy. A further advantage of the institutionalized convergence between the 
two sectors is that the gas supplier company will be able to distribute electricity 
thanks to the fusion. This is used in all of the households as long as the price of gas 
is lower. However, owing to this, the situation of the other competitors who wish to 
enter is, additionally, rendered more difficult. Further motivation between the two 
companies having different profiles can be the above-mentioned existing 
relationship between the supplier/customer networks, as well as the diminishing of 
transactional costs on account of this. Besides the two activities complementing each 
other, the new company established as a result of the fusion might be able to create 
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the possibility of risk-reducing diversification. And last but not least, the market 
position, the infrastructure, the instruments, the information and the market 
knowledge is obtainable through the takeover (Vince 2009).  
 
2.1.1. Types of fusion based on the revealed reasons behind them 
The phenomenon observable in the market of the European Union is also supported 
by the experience of the American energy market, namely that not the emergence of 
new companies will be the ruling tendency, but rather the establishment of vertically 
integrated companies interested in many sectors – such as electricity, gas, and 
maybe water – which are of a European scale. In the past eight years on the territory 
of the Union 30 percent of the reported fusions contained trans-boundary elements, 
while, though at an increasing rate, an average of 50 percent of them contained a 
trans-sectoral element (Verde 2008).  
It is typical that such fusions/takeovers realizing the convergence of the two 
sectors rather take place in those member states where liberalization is the most 
advanced, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy or France5. However, these 
are all fusions within one state. Nevertheless, such fusions/takeovers assisting the 
convergence of the two sectors might have a trans-boundary characteristic. 
Typically in reality this happens with the mainly Western-European companies, who 
are capital intensive and in a good position with a strong national basis, standing 
alert, waiting for the time of the separation in Eastern Europe, and as soon as it 
became possible, they selected from the pieces of the separated gas supply chain. 
Such cases were the takeover of gas business unit of Hungarian oil company, MOL 
by E.On, a German company acting on the electricity market (COMP/M.3696), or 
the takeover of the Polish electricity generator company, ZEDO by the Spanish 
Endesa company (COMP/M.4060).  
Although it might seem that reaching the aim of liberalization is rendered 
impossible by them, the fusions and takeovers are logical consequences of 
liberalization since the market actors try to answer the insecurity of demand and the 
fluctuation of prices by calling upon efficiency owing to economies of scale and 
economies of scope6. Furthermore, the essence of liberalization is to create a more 
and more widespread and at the same time a single energy market as the result of the 
cooperation of the Member States of the European Union. A bigger market is able to 
handle bigger undertakings, which are thus able to be more efficient and to establish 
economies of scale (Jacobsen et al 2006). So the pressure for fusions and takeovers 
is constantly strong. This phenomenon should not really be disapproved of on the 
                                                   
5 One of Europe‟s significantly grand electricity suppliers, the French EDF aims at reaching a level of 
53 billion m3 gas trade per year by 2015 (Zyuzev 2008). 
6 These takeovers have an obvious explanation if we know the relationship between the gas sector and 
electricity generation. Companies generating electricity hope to gain economic advantages and bigger 
safety of supply by the takeover of a gas company, while gas transmitters see a safe market when 
merging with an electricity generator company.  
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grounds of the market if these takeovers are conducted by such sectoral actors which 
are exclusively in private ownership and operate under the rules of the market.  
Now we move on to the other trend that is traceable in the market, according 
to Verde (2008). On the international energy markets – since these are public 
services – it is not unusual that dominant companies, moreover with state share in 
ownership, are competing (Losoncz 2007)7. Thus when a company, with a state 
share and in accordance with it controlled under the existing governmental interests, 
takes steps in order to protect the market, as well as the national sector, this might 
inevitably entail the creation of a “national champion”. It‟s just enough to mention 
the cases of Gaz de France/Suez (COMP/M.4180) or Gas Natural/Endesa 
(COMP/M.3986). A common feature of these fusions is that the concerned Member 
States had contributed to the success of the action directly and actively with a series 
of legislation created in an ad hoc way (Verde 2008). Instead of direct state aid, a 
more sophisticated version of active state action is the creation of market, as well as 
influencing the chances of the company in the acquisition and keeping of markets, 
briefly, the creation of a “national champion”.  
Such national interests can lie behind this as the protection against friendly or 
hostile takeovers. An aspect of security policy also belongs to protection, namely 
that certain activities should anyhow be conducted by national undertakings. The 
official government policy with respect to the national champion of the energy 
market is primarily the safety of supply, since an occasional market competition 
“dictated from above”, from their point of view, might endanger the safety of the 
supply mainly on the smaller gas markets which do not have their own resources and 
depend on high imports of energy. Nevertheless, this does not mean that only 
countries having such characteristics maintain national champions8. This might 
signify a new form of protectionism if the national actors are not protected from the 
competition, but the national market and the benefits of the incumbents are protected 
from the entrants. Pursuit of both tendencies is some kind of preparation for leave of 
the competitive market at Union level. Let alone that the companies established this 
way are able to represent a significant negotiation position when dealing with a 
supplier.  
Those interests and motivations, partially mentioned above, along which the 
fusions and takeovers of the energy market can be differentiated are summarized in 
Table 1, below. Some of these represent protectionist goals having an effect against 
liberalization, while others rather assist in preparation for the entry into the 
competitive market and rationalisation. But it is common among them that all of 
                                                   
7 The list of those companies interested in the energy sector which are a hundred percent or partially 
state owned is quite long. Those companies which have state ownership in their share capital are 
capable of operating under the rules of market economy, but it is more frequent that their management 
asserts other aspects of a not economic character: political pressure, etc. (Losoncz 2007). 
8 It‟s just enough to mention the cases of Gaz de France/Suez or Gas Natural/Endesa. 
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them could/can develop as the consequence of the liberalization process of the 
Union.  
Table 1. The revealed reasons behind the different types of fusions/takeovers in the 
energy market 








– Protection against (hostile) takeovers (GdF/Suez 
(COMP/M.5092), Helsingin/Vantaan/E.On 
Finland/Lahti/SEU (COMP/M.3507))9 
– (re)gaining of activities into national hands 
– Establishment of such a national market actor who 
has a strong negotiation position and thus capable 
of successful action against/with suppliers and 




– A cost-reducing step fulfilled by the 
integration of the different levels of 
the supply chain  
– Establishment of a strong national 
champion of the energy industry with 
the fusion of the national gas- and 






– Expansion in a geographical sense of companies 
providing certain partial activities (Enel/Slovenske 
Elektrarne (COMP/M.3665)) 
– Acquiring a focal role at the European level before 
the end of the process of liberalization 
(Tennet/E.On (COMP/M.5707)) 
– Companies generating electricity hope 
to gain economic advantages and 
bigger safety of supply by the 
takeover of a gas company 
(E.On/MOL (COMP/M.3696), 
Endesa/Zedo (COMP/M.4060)) 
–  Gas transmitters see a safe market 
when merging with an electricity 
generator company 
Note:
* If the EU case number is not provided after the name of the concerned companies, its 
explanation is that the effect of the fusion on the market was judged by the authority of the 
Member State. 
Source: own construction on the basis of Jacobsen et al (2006), Verde (2008) and of the 
website of the European Commission 
 
                                                   
9 One example of a hostile takeover can be the case of OMV-MOL, when MOL did not wish to get 
under the control of OMV. Finally OMV backed out of the situation owing to the expected condemning 
decision of the Commission and the enacting of a not definitely market-conform legal instrument, the 
Lex MOL, by the Hungarian Parliament.  
10 Earlier, in the course of Hungarian privatization, such a decision was rendered that the national gas 
producer and importer company (MOL Rt.) was not allowed to participate in the privatization of the 
gas transmitters covering big portion of the territory of the country (in order to avoid the establishment 
of vertical integration). Following the privatization, a few smaller gas transmitter companies were 
founded in some unsupplied parts of the country (the less inhabited and relatively underdeveloped 
territories). After a few years of operation it became clear that these companies could not develop 
owing to their poor state of capital, thus they intended to sell their market and activity. The only 
customer to come forward was MOL Rt. The transactions required authorization under the provisions 
of competition law. The Hungarian Competition Authority gave the permission for the fusion. The 
explanation in the decision was that since the price of natural gas is fixed there is no possibility to 
abuse it. (GVH 2000). 
11 This fusion can represent an example for the merger of gas supplier and electricity generator 
companies, as well as for the formation of multisectoral energy suppliers. 
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According to Valentiny (2008), it is not a negligible consequence of the 
appearance of the multi-sectoral service providers, that this way the traditional 
framework of regulation might be transformed. The yet separated regulatory 
institutions which operate on a sectoral basis are compelled to cooperation, and 
might even merge. With the proliferation of the transnational companies there is an 
increasing need for the establishment of inter-regional regulation. Already the Sapir 
Report of 2003 had considered the time ripe for the creation of a European-level 
regulatory institution (Sapir 2003). The regulatory tasks have long overstepped the 
level which is solvable within the national framework; however, the establishment 
of the European-level regulatory institution is yet to come.  
 
2.1.2. EU-level monitoring of concentration on the energy market 
In spite of all the positive consequences mentioned above, fusions and takeovers 
might result in anticompetition behaviour or outcomes, so in the European Union, 
the judgment of these is the task of the European Commission. Monitoring of 
fusions is the latest formed branch of competition law worldwide, but its role seems 
to be increasingly appreciated12. The reason for this might be that structural 
monitoring, as means to prevent the competition problem, can significantly reduce 
the need for an ex post intervention. The regulation of mergers in the European 
Union is the youngest branch of competition regulation of companies. Besides the 
national authorities, the Commission for a long time had dealt with concentrations 
under Articles 101 and 102 (previously Articles 81 and 82), although they had not 
been expressly designed for merger control; thus, it became necessary to separately 
regulate mergers. In contrast to the former, merger control does not mean the 
regulation of the behaviour, but the structure13. Previously in such cases, the national 
authorities rendered the decisions, which resulted in the situation that decisions of 
the cases were not based on the same standard. The first Regulation (EEC) No. 
4046/1989 entered into force in 1990, the present one, 139/2004/EC Regulation has 
been in effect since 2004. The essence of the change was to place in the centre of the 
valuation the SLC-test14, also used in the United States, instead of the previously 
applied dominance test. The proposal had resulted in great disputes. Putting an end 
                                                   
12 Although the tendency is well-traceable, naturally there are schools disagreeing with this right to 
monitor, as it can be seen from the assessment of competition policy of the Chicago School.  
13 Under the provisions of the 139/2004/EC Regulation, a merger takes place when a concentration 
arises with the following conditions: “the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings 
or parts of undertakings, or the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract 
or by any other means, of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other 
undertakings.” 
14 The essence of the SLC-test (“Substantial Lessening of Competition” test) or often cited as 
significant lessening of competition test is that it is the task of the competition authority, during the 
merger control, is to decide whether the merger can result in significant lessening of the competition. 
This used to be called the SIEC-test in continental competition policy. 
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to these, according to the new merger regulation, which entered into force at the 
same time with the May 2004 enlargement of the EU, granting of authorisation for 
a merger cannot be refused if it does not significantly impede effective competition 
(Significantly Impede Effective Competition, the SIEC-test), especially if it does not 
result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Otherwise, the merger 
has to be banned. With respect to merger control in the EU, the objective of 
monitoring structural changes concerning a certain product or service is to hinder 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, which would significantly 
impede effective competition on significant parts of the common market.  
Another reason for the modification of the regulation was that it is 
disadvantageous for the operation of the economy when actions decided by the 
actors of the market are delayed, thus losing the power of surprise, and with 
governmental or other hostile instruments applied by other competitors they are 
placed in an impossible situation. Thus the pending legal situation existing until the 
end of the merger-authorization proceedings can have disadvantageous effects on 
market processes. Although these disadvantages are balanced by the protection of 
public interest relating to competition, it is reasonable that authorization proceedings 
should last for the shortest possible period of time – without neglecting the 
requirement of well-founded decision-making (Bodócsi 2004).  
Concentrations creating dominant ownership shares, often not exempt from 
overlap of owners, are able to result in a more transparent situation with respect to 
the conditions of competition, as it has already been stated by Vince (2008) in 
relation to the Hungarian market. The group of owners, who has a share and 
influence in the undertakings of the energy market, might get narrower. In certain 
cases fewer owners control the actors of the market. Parallel with this, the separate 
groups of owners participate in the management of the companies not directly, but 
through their interests. On the other side of the scale we find that concentration in 
ownership might create the possibility of enforcement of the advantages stemming 
from dominance (Vince 2008). It is the task of the competition authorities to take 
into consideration this possibility by analysis of the horizontal, vertical and portfolio 
effects, and to reveal the concentrations which restrict competition.  
2.2. Other possible competition consequences of the concentrations existing in the 
sector 
It can be stated concerning the effect of the already concluded vertical integration on 
competition that in most of the countries a very high level of organizational 
concentration has been formed (see the Figure 1). The weight of the three biggest 
gas transmitter companies exceeds 60 percent in all the countries except the United 
Kingdom. One of the benchmarks of competition at the national markets is the full 
market share of the three biggest generator (electricity) and wholesale transmitter 
(gas) companies (COM(2005) 568).  
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Figure 1. Capacity-share of the three biggest participants and generators of the 
wholesale market in the gas- and electricity markets 
 
Note: Member states are indicated in percentage according to the capacity-share of 
the three biggest participants in their electricity (upper row) and gas (lower row) 
markets. 
Source: Vince (2008) based on COM (2005) 568 
 
If possibilities of ex ante regulation of competition are exhausted owing to the 
authorization of mergers and sectoral regulations, then the need might still occur for 
the control of behaviour of the companies created by concentration. This is the role 
of the other areas of EU competition law.  
 
2.2.1.  The liberalized gas market, dominance and questions of competition 
regulation related to it 
Under the EU's competition rules – basically Article 102 of the TFEU – a dominant 
position is such that a firm (or group of firms) would be in a position to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers15. Such a position would usually arise when a firm or group of firms 
accounted for a large share of the supply in any given market, provided that other 
factors analysed in the assessment (such as entry barriers, customers' capacity to 
react, etc.) point in the same direction.  
Concentration is not the sole way how dominant undertakings can be created 
in the energy market. During the privatization and liberalization of the network 
industries, despite all the efforts, the undertakings already in the market with a 
monopoly, thanks to formerly being a public service provider, had not lost much of 
their starting advantages, and according to the practice, they still have been 
                                                   
15 This definition is given by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 13 February 1979 in Case 85/76, 
Hoffmann-La Roche [1979] ECR 461, and confirmed by the Court in subsequent judgments. 
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dominant, determinant actors of the market16. It is obvious that the service provider 
undertakings, as former monopoly actors on the market with state ownership, 
endeavour to still keep their role, and their significance after liberalization. Those 
markets can represent an exception where the former natural monopoly service 
provider undertakings were purchased during privatization fully or partially by 
capital intensive foreign companies. However, in this case it‟s only the ownership 
structure that has changed and not the position. The position of the dominant 
participants of the market in the European Union is further strengthened by the 
increasingly criticized special state shares called golden shares (Valentiny 2007). 
Furthermore there are markets where they have the same share level as prior to the 
opening of the market, and thanks to the separation of properties executed with 
respect to the Union legislation, often they could even purchase in other markets, 
thus further increasing their market share at European level.  
It is important to highlight that the competition law of the European Union 
does not penalize dominance itself, but the abuse of it and the possible loss of the 
consumers. Its aim is not, or at least not primarily, to dismember such giant 
companies, but to provide an efficient and competition-based European energy 
market17. Also, an argument for keeping the dominant position is, according to 
Voszka (2009) and Jacobsen et al (2006), that the change of structure of the market 
under the aegis of liberalization might worsen the competitiveness of the whole 
sector, thus curtailment of the incumbent can be at least in the same way detrimental 
as the lack of competition.  
The incumbent monopolist, competition distorting, strategic behaviour 
directed to the hindrance of entry can, for example, be below-cost pricing, 
confinement of the inputs necessary for production from the other competitors, 
price-discrimination, or tying, which are typical subjects of the competition 
investigations proceeded by the competition authorities. Generally it can be stated 
that competition authorities have to intervene in these cases if a monopoly impedes 
entry into the market with such behaviour which is profitable only owing to its 
capability of keeping the other competitors away. However, these behaviours and 
the actions against them belong to the sphere of Union and national competition law. 
Significant cases of the past years were for example: the proceedings against E.ON, 
RWE and Gaz de France for sharing of the French and German market 
(COMP/39388), while Electrabel (Belgian) and EDF (French) as two incumbent 
                                                   
16 The competition-distorting behaviour of such companies can be attained in many different ways, 
starting with the impediment of other competitors‟ access to the essential networks, the application of 
inadequate pricing techniques or, for example, cross-financing.  
17 An argument for keeping the dominant position might be the theory of Schumpeter, according to 
which imperfect competition or monopolistic power can be favourable for research because the 
accumulation of the profit of monopoly creates for the undertakings the financial sources for research 
and for coping with the instability of the results. Furthermore, the power of monopoly and impediment 
of the entry into the market makes it possible to prevent imitation and to sustain a high level of 
profitability.  
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undertakings had abused their dominance in their own national markets 
(COMP/38091)18. The European Commission had instituted anti-trust proceedings 
against RWE in May 2007 (COMP/39402), in the course of which Brussels 
endeavoured to prove its suspicion that the German energy company really provided 
unnecessary barriers in the regional gas market of North Rhein Westphalia for the 
entry into one of the most important so-called “core markets”. In 2006 the 
Commission initiated proceedings against an Italian energy provider undertaking 
called ENI for dominant market position (COMP/39315). The objective of ENI and 
its associates had been an alleged market foreclosure not only on their parts of the 
national markets, but also from the Austrian and German market interests. Judgment 
of this is a difficult question of jurisprudence since in the network industries 
frequently it has caused hardships to separate fair competitive behaviour from, for 
example, foreclosure strategy (Kovács 2008)19. However, this again proves the role 
and influence of the regulation of the European Union also in other areas. For the 
new entrants, the situation is even more aggravated in that most of the pipelines are 
overloaded owing to the long-term agreements, thus there‟s relatively little space left 
for the transmission of the free quantity of gas20. Until now this situation was 
                                                   
18 In 2006 the Commission initiated proceedings against an Italian energy provider undertaking called 
ENI for dominant market position (COMP/39315). The objective of ENI and its associates had been an 
alleged market foreclosure not only in their parts of the national markets, but also from the Austrian 
and German market interests. The behaviours distorting the market were capacity hoarding and 
strategic underinvestment in development. These activities were practiced by ENI S.p.A and its 
affiliates or partners (Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH, Trans Europa Naturgas Pipeline GmbH & Co. 
KG, ENI Deutschland S.p.A. and Eni Gas Transport International SA) together. In the interpretation of 
Bökönyi (2005), this exhausts integration applied for securing market dominance. It has to be added 
that this investigation was not part of the competition-related inquiry of the sector.  
19 The basis of the proceeding was that according to the suspicion of the Commission, the instrument of 
this would have been the impediment of access to the gas transmitter network for the potential new 
service providers. As an effect of these, the RWE concern announced on June 2, 2008 that it would sell 
its gas pipeline network of 4100 kilometres. The German energy producer hoped that in exchange for 
this decision the Commission would end the proceedings against it for alleged abuse of dominant 
market position. This proceeding had not only threatened them with a grave fine, but would have also 
created the possibility for their business partners to sue them for great sums of compensatory claims. 
The Commission had welcomed the decision right then, however it was able to conduct the market test 
of the offer of the company group only on December 5, 2008. This test meant that the Commission had 
collected commentaries from all the concerned parties concerning whether the promises of the 
company were adequate for dismissal of the anxieties about the abuse of dominance. The concerned 
parties had a one-month deadline from the publication of the notice for sending their opinions to the 
Commission. Brussels declared in advance that if the test proved to be positive, the Commission would 
accept the commitments, thus making them legally binding. As the consequence of the outcome of the 
test, the Commission accepted the offer of RWE in March, 2009, because the result of the test was that 
sale of the gas pipeline network was necessary and proportionate in the opinion of the concerned 
parties. 
20 It has occurred several times that capacity had been reserved without actual transmission, thus 
impeding the entry of new competitors into the market. Later even a rule had to be provided for this, 
according to which in case somebody is not conducting actual transmission in the previously bought 
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perfectly adequate for the European energy giants, who, respectively, have not 
activated themselves for the development of the transmission infrastructure. 
One of the possibilities of abuse of dominant position in the energy sector is 
the so-called “English clause” referring to which the company does not let the 
customers leave. The English clause prescribes for the customer the obligation of 
reporting all better offers provided for them, and that the customer can accept it only 
in the case if the original supplier does not offer the same, or in some cases, a more 
advantageous one. This obligation might have the same effect as the non-compete 
obligation, especially if the customer has to reveal the name of the company making 
the better offer. Besides, by increasing the transparency of the market, this might 
facilitate collusion between competing suppliers (2000/C 291/01)21. However, this 
issue has another side also, that is there might be other reasons for hampering the 
withdrawal from a contract. The service provider might make investments designed 
for personal needs, which it would not undertake without the insurance of long-term 
commitment. Thus, it is not worth it to expressly forbid the application of English 
clauses, since reduction of the costs of negotiation arising from this possibility can 
be in the interest of both parties (Antal–Pomázi 2009)22.  
It is also part of the cases of dominance when the creation, maintenance, and 
protection of the above-mentioned and so-called “national champions” happens. 
This phenomenon partially belongs to the Union legislation of state aid. Frequently 
it is part of the maintenance that such supposedly strategic companies are artificially 
kept alive by not particularly EU-conforming means, such as market-seeking, state 
order, or consolidation (Voszka 2008). Nevertheless, some other objectives, such as 
motivation for innovation or European competitiveness in a wider sense, might be 
impaired by the lack of competition in the sector. Such, mainly not natural 
monopolies, further increase the need for regulation. National champion companies 
are not motivated in providing access for other service providers to the networks in 
their ownership (Röller et al 2007). In the light of this, some of the member states 
sacrifice domestic competition and support the horizontally and/or vertically 
integrated national giant energy companies in the interest of securing their already 
made investments and the access to the energy resources23.  
                                                                                                                                   
capacity, then the system manager can freely sell it for a third party, while also keeping the originally 
paid sum (Patkó 2009). 
21 Also in Hungary, in case of five energy supplier companies (DÉDÁSZ, ÉDÁSZ, ELMŰ, ÉMÁSZ 
and TITÁSZ) the question arose whether they were hindering their customers from entering into the 
free market by fixing the principle of “most favourable offer” in the contract. The principle was the 
Hungarian equivalent of the English clause, and in 2008 a decision had been delivered in the cases (Vj–
108/2006/46., Vj–107/2006/76., Vj–104/2006/130., Vj–105/2006/66., Vj–109/2006/99.).  
22 The Hungarian Competition Authority took the case further and declared that the application of the 
principle is the safeguard for the preparation for the opening of the market by the incumbents, and thus 
the consumer can in reality gain advantages from the free market competition. 
23 Glachant and Finon (2004) similarly present the French electricity supplier market and its national 
champion, EDF, who stayed in state ownership thanks to a daring reform in 1999–2000 (Vogelsang 
2004). 
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These cases prove that in spite of the competition policy being a horizontal 
policy and independently from the gravity of the country of seat of the concerned 
undertaking, anybody can be punished by the Directorate-General for Competition 
of the European Commission; however, efficient supervision of the competition is 
missing. This fact and the low level of investments in the sector together might 
result in such further cases with great likelihood (Dreyer et al 2010).  
 
2.2.2. Cartels in the gas market 
Legislation of the European Union with respect to the prohibition of cartels (Article 
101 of the TFEU) distinguishes three forms of collusion. The agreement, which 
covers all such behaviours that express the parties common will to behave in a 
certain, defined way in the market. This can be informal, based on trust, and it can 
be created in any loose form. Decisions of associations of undertakings usually 
pertain to vocational organizations and sector unions. While concerted practices do 
not reach the level of agreement, they might serve as a wilful substitution of it. The 
types of a cartel can be horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. In the former case, the 
agreement is concluded between competitors of the same level. The vertical cartel is 
when the participants in it are companies on different levels of the production 
process. A conglomerate is when more than one, not vertically related markets stand 
behind the concerted practices. 
Under the prohibition of restriction of competition, those agreements and 
concerted practices are forbidden which negatively affect economic competition. 
Most often these are price-fixing, sharing of the market, restriction or control of 
production processes, tying, discriminative behaviour against the different partners 
and other behaviours.  
In the past years an energy cartel‟s case (COMP/C.39401) has set the record 
for penalties, where the Commission had fined both of the companies in the case, 
namely E.On AG and GDF Suez SA for 533 million EUR, for the sharing of the 
German and French energy gas markets. The two gas supplier companies, according 
to the investigation, had agreed on the sharing of the market in 1975, under which 
they would not sell gas transmitted through the MEGAL-pipeline, constructed by 
them, in each others markets. They maintained their behaviour subsequent to the 
liberalization of the European gas market, this way depriving the German and 
French customers from the advantages of the competition in the gas market. The 
significance of the decision, apart from the sum of the penalty, is that this had been 
the first time when the Commission fined participants of the energy market (GVH 
2009). 
Nevertheless, collusion can also be in positive way, for example, if it is a 
cooperation for development which results in the growth of the welfare of 
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consumers and consequently of society. When somebody concludes cooperation24, it 
should be known that according to some economists, competition ends there, and it 
immediately becomes suspicious. In contrast to this, others state that these relations 
are absolutely normal forms of cooperation and creation of values. If the state does 
not intervene, then the undertaking or groups of undertakings have a great role in 
economic governance not only owing to the fact that they have all the means to 
restrict competition, for gaining a monopoly position and because they use this 
possibility, but because often this is the luckiest and most effective form of 
cooperation. If they hinder this in the name of competition, then in some cases its 
damages can be more than its profits25.  
3. Conclusions 
When liberalization guarantees conditions of competition and entry, then the next 
task is for the competition regulation to supervise the changes of structure as a result 
of the actions on the market, and to follow and control them. This is of high priority, 
especially because many of the former vertically integrated incumbent companies 
have survived the liberalization, instead of the many competitors intended to be 
created by the separation of ownership for the solution to market concentration. 
They could even get stronger as a result of the new possibilities arising from the 
separation. Other European undertakings have weakened owing to the separation, 
and through liberalization they have sacrificed their dependency for competition, 
thus becoming independent from the state has made them more exposed to the 
capital intensive and strategic-type foreign supplier companies (e.g. Gazprom, 
Sonatrach, and Statoil). We can find examples for any of the tendencies in all the 
member states.  
Interests and motivation behind the concentrations experienced in the energy 
market can be very wide-ranging. Some of these represent protectionist objectives 
                                                   
24 For example, if the insurance company agrees with the service station that it would send all its 
insured cars there; or if the bank makes it difficult for the indebted to agree with another bank 
providing a better offer (for example it prescribes a high prepayment fee); or if a company buys one of 
its suppliers, or simply prescribes that it cannot supply other competitors, then the economist 
supporting competition calls upon the state, expecting the protection and enforcement of competition 
by the state.  
25 Recognition of this opportunity was exactly the reason why Oliver E. Williamson had been granted a 
Nobel Prize in 2009. According to him, it‟s not only the logic of competition that is hidden in the 
market, but also cooperation and collaboration. Production, and the creation of values often require 
cooperation. It‟s just enough to think about clusters, producer organizations, research centres, etc. It 
was the subject of his research to consider in what types this cooperation can be formed. His research 
thesis was exactly, starting from the work of Coase, to define when it is worthwhile to organize 
production by contracting and when inside the company, for example, by purchase of the supplier. The 
theory of transactional costs developed by the 1970s does not consider vertical integrations (or other 
atypical forms of contracts) as the means of cartelling, but one of the ways of saving on the costs of 
contracts. 
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having an effect against liberalization, while others rather assist in preparation for 
the entry into the competitive market and rationalisation. But it‟s common among 
them, that all of them could/can develop as the consequence of the liberalization 
process of the Union. The capital intensive companies operating in the Union or in 
countries outside of the European Union, while preparing for the full opening or 
already being well-prepared, can shape the markets in a direction advantageous for 
them at all times, in the existing (or non-existing) framework of competition law, 
taking the opportunities provided by liberalization – no matter whether it‟s about 
securing the service or elimination of other competitors.  
Thus, it is obvious that although the aim of liberalization is/was the creation 
of competition and the increase of intensity of competition, the market tendencies do 
not point to that direction. In most of the markets it seems that after the initial 
flaring, owing to the compulsory opening and separation of the market, restoration 
takes place. Besides all the positive consequences of liberalization it has reserved 
possibilities not taken into consideration by all of the member states. If it was 
possible, seeing this tendency, it would be worthwhile to draw the balance of 
quantifiable profits and costs or losses gained by liberalization. These could not be 
estimated in advance; opinions can be formed only in retrospect. 
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